

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PAPERS ON BUREAU PRIORITIES

May 22, 1980

Prepared in Response to the Request of Secretary Muskie

COORT/SENSITIVE RDS-2 5/21/00

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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## CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER

## ARA PRIORITIES

Latin America's fast-paced problems include:

- Illegal migration and refugees: of Mexicans and Caribbeans enhances the stability of their countries and possibly our productivity -- but produces serious social and political strains.
- Changing trade patterns; U.S.-Mexico trade alone is 50% more than with Africa -- but new tensions are developing over energy and Latin America's growing competitiveness in our markets at home and abroad.
- Instability in Central America and the Caribbean: Poverty and violence in small countries so close to us damage our image -- and are exploited against us.
- Differences with South America: Argentina's grain sales to the Soviet Union and Brazil's stubborn independence symbolize the changed power equation with emerging world forces with whom we have yet to work out a satisfactory balance.
- Cuba's enormous dependence on the USSR impedes improved relations and keeps Cuba dangerously in the forefront of international events.

Our ability to affect these problems and protect U.S. interests is dangerously limited. Their potential impact on American life suggests two basic priorities:

- improved public understanding of the problems we face and how to approach them. We cannot expect others to accommodate to us (on Iran, Afghanistan, the Olympics, human rights, narcotics, migration, trade, etc.) if we do not accommodate to them (on development, security, North-South issues generally).
- an increase in the amounts and flexibility in the use of resources. U.S. bilateral assistance to Latin America has declined into economic insignificance. The French and the Dutch put more into their tiny hemisphere possessions, and the Soviets ten times more into Cuba alone, than we do in the entire hemisphere. In addition, travel and personnel restrictions limit our ability to make our case, both domestically and in Latin America.



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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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May 21, 1980

TO:

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL

The Secretary

FROM .

HA - Patricia M. Derian

## High Priority Items

Institutionalization of the human rights policy - Despite extensive legislation and the President's commitment, human rights issues are not yet adequately incorporated into decision-making. We need more systematically to apply human rights criteria to security assistance issues. HA has not been included at relevant PRCs when issues significant to human rights are raised, e.g., last week's PRC on Argentina. The regional bureaus continue to evince excessive "clientitis." Many posts overseas fail to do their part in implementing the policy.

Argentina - A PRC meeting May 14 recommended that U.S. policy be changed to seek warmer relations with Argentina in order to counteract alleged Soviet influence. Given the documented brutality of the Argentine regime-up to 15,000 innocent persons tortured and killed-and the extremely low chance of significant Soviet influence with the right-wing military junta, I firmly believe that we must stick to our "cool and correct" policy.

<u>Israel</u> - We need to oppose unequivocally, in public as well as in private, the harsh measures of collective punishment applied by Israeli authorities against the population on the West Bank. Our human rights concerns so require; also, Israeli brutalities substantially increase alienation on the West Bank, thereby making more difficult an overall settlement.

Korea - The threat which the harsh martial law measures pose to political stability in South Korea requires firm action to influence the authorities to moderate their course. As they will be most sensitive to changes in the military relationship, we should identify arms transfers which can be deferred without significantly affecting joint U.S.-ROK military capabilities, e.g., F-16 aircraft. While denial would be symbolically important, it would not likely have a negative impact on ROK capabilities.

<u>Liberia</u> - I deem ill-advised the May 7 PRC decision to afford military assistance to the coup leaders who are responsible for gross human rights violations and whose political viability is highly questionable.

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